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INTRODUCTION 
As communication increasingly shifts to digital platforms, 
information derived from online open sources is starting to become 
critical in creating an evidentiary basis for international crimes. While 
journalists have led the development of many newly emerging open 
source investigation methodologies, courts have heightened the 
requirements for verifying and preserving a chain of custody—
information linking all of the individuals who possessed the content and 
indicating the duration of their custody—creating a need for standards 
that are just now beginning to be identified, articulated, and accepted by 
the international legal community. In this article, we discuss the impact 
of internet-based open source investigations on international criminal 
legal processes, as well as challenges related to their use. We also offer 
best practices for lawyers, activists, and other individuals seeking to 
admit open source information—including content derived from social 
media—into courts. 
I.  BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF ONLINE OPEN SOURCE 
INFORMATION 
A. Legal Uses of OSI in Evidence-Gathering 
The use of online open source information2 has a long history in 
intelligence gathering. Historically, online open source information was 
leveraged by intelligence agents and journalists to gather information on 
foreign actors. The Crimean War (1853–1856) was the first major 
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conflict to be heavily documented by journalists through visual imagery 
and the written word, which in many ways engendered the modern 
military-media relationship.3 For those who wanted to understand what 
was happening to whom and when, all they had to do was open a 
newspaper—a form of open source content. During World War II, 
President Roosevelt allotted emergency funds to monitor foreign 
broadcasts for intelligence purposes, ultimately leading to the creation of 
the Central Intelligence Agency. By the Cold War, television, phone 
lines, and radios were being exploited by both sides as a means for 
gathering open source intelligence.4 
Criminal investigators typically use open source information for 
the following two reasons: (1) to discover new information relevant to 
their cases and (2) to verify and authenticate existing information 
(including witness testimony), mostly through the analysis of videos and 
photographs obtained via public, quasi-public, or private sources.5 
Discovery and verification can fulfill several needs related to producing 
reliable information helpful to legal process.6   
 First, regarding online discovery, open source methods can be 
especially helpful for generating lead, linkage and contextual 
information. Lead information is information that “leads” investigators to 
potential evidence, such as witnesses or documents.7 For example, 
perpetrators who boast about their exploits on Facebook or Twitter might 
be geolocated based on identifying markers in the background of 
pictures, generating critical information about where they’re located or 
where crucial events took place.8 Open source information can also 
provide linkage evidence, enabling courts to effectively connect high-
level perpetrators who may have ordered, condoned or failed to punish 
criminal activity to on the ground implementers. For example, open 
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sources, including social media platforms, can be used to help establish 
networks surrounding the accused, or to document relevant 
communications among disparate actors.9 Video footage posted to social 
media can especially be helpful in establishing not just the actus reas—
the physical act of the crime—but also the mens rea—the often hard-to-
prove intent behind that act. For instance, the intent of the accused might 
be made clear through posts on social media that brag about the desire to 
kill all of the individuals who comprise a particular religious or ethnic 
group (possible genocide), or describe a systematic strategy for seeking 
revenge on a person or class of people (possible crime against humanity). 
Open source information can also be used to provide contextual 
information, offering insights into the who, when, or where of an 
incident, and/or providing information that corroborates witness 
testimony.10 Given the plethora of problems with overreliance on witness 
testimony such as bribery, deception, or memory loss,11 the move 
towards gathering and using digital data as a means to corroborate such 
testimony is promising.  
Second, open source information can help with the verification 
of existing information, including data collected through online open 
sources, traditional legal investigations, and from activists on the ground. 
For example, source materials may include videos and photographs sent 
to human rights organizations or court investigators whose alleged 
content requires validation. Such verification and authentication are 
critical for non-governmental organizations and courts, as both must 
establish the credibility of the information they use.12 
Citizens outside of conflict zones increasingly play a prominent 
role in both the discovery and verification process.13 For example, 
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Bellingcat, an investigative network run by citizen journalists, has 
conducted open source investigations to establish responsibility for the 
downing of MH17 over Ukraine, as well as potential crimes committed 
during the Syria conflict.14 Other groups, such as the University of 
California, Berkeley’s Human Rights Investigations Lab and the 
University of Essex’s Human Rights Centre,15 rely on students to 
conduct the labor-intensive work of gathering and verifying information 
from public sources for advocacy and legal accountability purposes. 
Whether obtained online, directly from the source, or through an 
intermediary, students can verify and therefore help legitimize (or 
discredit) activist videos.16  
Unfortunately, however, even when verified, photographs and 
videos may not be particularly helpful for courts if what the 
photographer or videographer captured provides little contextual, lead, or 
linkage information. As a result, the human rights organization, 
WITNESS, created the “Video as Evidence Field Guide,” which offers 
useful guidance for first responders, activists, survivors, and others who 
hope to document violations via video in ways that maximize those 
videos’ utility for courts.17  Similarly, the International Bar Association 
launched a mobile application called “eyeWitness to Atrocities” to 
document violations and preserve that information for court purposes.18 
The application collects the date and location of recorded footage from 
three different sources and creates a digital fingerprint to prevent that 
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16 Rutkin, supra note 8. 
17 Video as Evidence Field Guide, WITNESS, https://vae.witness.org/video-as-
evidence-field-guide/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2019). 
18 Collect Verifiable Photos and Videos, FAQs, EYEWITNESS, 
http://www.eyewitnessproject.org/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2017); see also Hamilton, 
supra note 12, at 17–18. 
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information from being edited. The software also establishes and 
preserves a chain of custody.19 
B. Benefits 
 Though open source information has been systematically mined 
from the Internet by human rights advocates and international criminal 
investigators for a relatively short time, its potential contribution to the 
field is apparent. Examples of this contribution include providing 
“access” to conflict zones that cannot be physically accessed for security, 
diplomatic, or logistical reasons, engaging civilians on the ground, and 
enabling stronger investigations by generating information that 
corroborates or discredits witness testimony and other evidence.  
 Recently, open source information has provided a means to 
access information in remote conflict zones in Libya,20 Syria,21 
Cameroon,22 and Myanmar.23 This includes not only photographs and 
videos as mentioned above, but also data derived from crowdsourcing 
tools such as Wikimapia or satellite imagery provided through online 
platforms such as Google Earth. Satellite imagery is increasingly 
available through public platforms at no or low cost and may also be 
available through closed or open sources. It can help establish the 
location of an atrocity and show changes to a particular location over 
time (such as before and after visuals of a hospital bombing).24 This 
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24 See AAAS Sci. Responsibility, Human Rights & Law Program, Conflict in 
Aleppo, Syria: A Retrospective Analysis, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF 
SCI.,  https://www.aaas.org/aleppo_retrospective (last visited Aug. 3, 2018) 
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temporal mapping can assist in the development of an event chronology 
(for example, showing the before and after of razed villages), or can be 
used to help predict future events and plan for interventions.25 
One organization that has effectively used open source 
information is the Syrian Archive, an organization dedicated to 
preserving evidence of human rights violations committed by all sides of 
the conflict in Syria.26 The Archive has gathered more than 1,400,000 
videos, some of which have been verified and appear to depict chemical 
weapons attacks that violate international law.27 This is invaluable 
documentation given the increasingly hostile propaganda efforts of some 
of the world’s most powerful political players.28 The Archive leverages 
both Syrian-based human rights advocates as well as remote media 
activists, journalists, and lawyers to document, preserve, and verify 
information related to the conflict, underscoring the incredible potential 
impact of coordinated civilian efforts.29 
C. Limitations 
 Despite its many strengths, open source information is also 
subject to serious limitations. For example, the engagement of everyday 
citizens in documenting atrocities through video and photography may 
prove to be a double-edged sword. Video evidence can expose potential 
witnesses and the videographer, endangering their families and 
communities.30 Thus, taking steps to ensure adequate protection of 
individuals is critical, and the potential risks involved in storing or 
releasing images or video content must be carefully calibrated.31 
Mitigating the risk of endangering witnesses and civilian investigators 
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remains one of the most challenging aspects of this work. Further, when 
users choose to remain anonymous, the process by which to admit such 
user-generated evidence may be ambiguous as judges wrestle with 
assigning probative value to the information.32 
In addition, the likelihood of acquiring and potentially using 
misinformation found online is relatively high, so verification of that 
content is crucial.  Some of the most common pitfalls of open source 
information include misattribution, staging, and technical manipulation.33 
Misattribution occurs frequently and involves deliberately or 
inadvertently recycling online content with the wrong date, time, or 
location.34 Staging transpires when one party attempts to frame another 
by “staging” and filming an event that never occurred, or edits a video to 
mislead viewers about what actually took place. Technical manipulation 
involves manipulating photos and videos with Photoshop or other photo 
editing tools (e.g., swapping out military insignia).35 Further, generative 
adversarial networks are increasingly being used to generate “deep 
fakes,” artificially-generated videos that suggest someone said or did 
something that never occurred in real life.36 Given the vast number of 
ways digital content can be altered, information derived from open 
sources must be handled carefully, especially if used to demonstrate the 
“truth” of what took place. “Ground truthing”—having those on the 
ground in a conflict zone confirm the accuracy of open source analysis—
and engaging in verification processes that focus on both source and 
content analysis remain critical components of ensuring the validity of 
open source content. 
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D. The Need for Open Source Information: Shortcomings of 
Witness Testimony 
 Despite the many challenges found in validating digital 
evidence, weaknesses inherent to witness testimony make the move 
toward incorporating other forms of information vital. Triangulation of 
physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence remains the gold 
standard; as a form of documentary evidence, open source information 
can be helpful for corroborating witness testimony and developing the 
strongest possible narrative in court.   
 In recent years, the International Criminal Court (ICC) has 
recognized the need to diversify its evidence due to witness tampering 
and other witness-related challenges, specifically noting witness 
intimidation and protection as key challenges in its 2012–2015 Strategic 
Plan.37 Later, in its 2016–2018 Strategic Plan, the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) of the ICC found that witness interference—the act of 
altering or attempting to alter the content of a witness’s testimony, or 
helping to prevent a witness from testifying—may have occurred in eight 
of the first nine cases at the ICC.38 The OTP states that “almost all cases 
in the confirmation of charges and trial phases have been or are 
confronted with incidents of obstruction of justice—in particular witness 
tampering.”39 Witness interference is thus a serious threat to the Court’s 
legitimacy and effective functioning. In the 2012 Lubanga case, the 
chamber concluded that nine out of the thirty-six witnesses were not 
credible after it was found that prosecution intermediaries may have 
coached their witnesses, child soldiers, to lie about their identities and 
experiences.40 In the 2016 Bemba case, five defendants, including Jean-
Pierre Bemba himself, were convicted of coercing fourteen witnesses 
into providing false testimony.41 Such distortions undermine the rule of 
law and can lead to wrongful convictions or acquittals. Furthermore, the 
failure to protect witnesses testifying at the ICC can have grave 
consequences for the safety and well-being of witnesses, their families, 
and communities.  
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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 2–3 (Nov. 2016), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/factsheet-icc-witness-
interference-20161116.pdf [hereinafter Briefing Paper]. 
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40 See Briefing Paper, supra note 37, at 4–5.  
41  Id. at 4.   
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 In addition, memories can be fallible under the best of 
circumstances; time and trauma can further exacerbate challenges with 
input, storage, and recall. Substantial literature exists on the fallacies of 
human memory and the tendency to erroneously recollect events.42 In the 
2016 ICC case, Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, forensic psychologist Dr. John 
Charles Yuille provided his expert opinion on methods of recall:  
“[H]uman memory is reconstructive . . . . We don't play a tape back. 
We recreate a memory at the time of recall. And when we recreate 
the memory, there are two different forms that the memory can take. 
One form is where the person . . . remember[s] the event as they 
originally . . . perceived it. So they're looking through their eyes and 
recalling the event as it unfolded in front of them. There is a second 
kind of recall in which a person will recall an event but see 
themselves in it, that is they don't perceive it as they originally did. 
It's as if they were at a different place in the room and watching it 
unfold and they actually see themselves in the event.”43 
The malleability of memory was similarly underscored in a 1998 study 
by Elizabeth Loftus, a leading cognitive psychologist who illustrated the 
ability of a third party to introduce false facts and alter how subjects 
remembered various events.44 This phenomenon was later dubbed the 
“misinformation effect.”45  
External interference is just one form of memory distortion; 
memories can be distorted even at their inception.46 In addition, bias can 
distort recall. Further, while confidence and accuracy tend to correlate, 
witness confidence levels are often higher for incorrect information than 
correct information when misleading information is injected into 
conversations.47 Thus, the malleability of the human mind, coupled with 
the potential of witness intimidation and suggestion by third parties, as 
well as cognitive biases, necessitates corroborating information.  
 In cases facing dismissal due to evidentiary deficiencies, open 
source information may prove pivotal to preventing a case from being 
dismissed due to insufficient evidence.  Most recently, evidentiary 
deficiencies proved determinative in the cases of Gbagbo and Blé Goude 
at the International Criminal Court in January 2019. The two defendants 
had been charged with crimes against humanity—including murder and 
																																																						
42 See generally Engelhardt, supra note 11.  
43 Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, ICC-01/04-02/06), Trial Hearing, p. 27, ¶¶2–
11 (Apr. 18, 2016). 
44 Engelhardt, supra note 11, at 26. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 27.  
47 Id. at 28. 
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rape—allegedly committed in Cote d’Ivoire in 2010 and 2011 during the 
aftermath of the country’s 2010 presidential election.48  In the acquittal, 
the Court noted that prosecutors had failed to provide sufficient evidence 
to suggest their culpability.49 Indeed, evidence can be particularly 
difficult to obtain in the aftermath of conflict. Witnesses may fear 
retribution and refrain from coming forward, and supporting 
documentation may have been destroyed, be inaccessible, or be 
otherwise nonexistent.50 Investigators may also simply fail to gather all 
available information from both offline and online sources.  
Today, citizens and journalists are increasingly documenting 
human rights violations from the frontlines and sharing that information 
online.51 Once such documentation undergoes an extensive verification 
process by an established expert or expert community, such online 
information can be helpful for strengthening cases and should be 
admissible in court, especially if witnesses can testify to its veracity 
II. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS SEEKING TO INCORPORATE 
OPEN SOURCE EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIALS 
As noted above, online open source investigative methods 
relevant to international criminal investigations have largely been 
pioneered by investigative journalists, the intelligence community, and 
human rights activists. However, international investigators and 
prosecutors are increasingly recognizing that the protocol for 
determining what online content is potentially relevant, how information 
is captured and preserved, and how such information is presented in 
court can radically differ when used for legal as opposed to intelligence 
or advocacy purposes.52 Thus, there is a significant need for standards 
that bring consistency to the field so that (1) international investigators 
can manage online content to maximize its potential value, and (2) 
																																																						
48 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, SITUATION IN COTE D’IVOIRE: 
PROSECUTOR V. LAURENT GBAGBO AND CHARLES BLÉ GOUDÉ (2019), available 
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CaseInformationSheets/gbagbo-goudeEng.pdf.  
49 See, e.g., Oumar Ba, The International Criminal Court just acquitted the 




50 UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW: HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., DIGITAL 
FINGERPRINTS: USING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE TO ADVANCE PROSECUTIONS AT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 3 (2014), available at 
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/HRC/Digital_fingerprints_interior_cover2.p
df.  
51 See Hamilton, supra note 12, at 3–4. 
52 Alexa Koenig et al., supra note 3, at 694.  
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judges and other decision-makers know how to evaluate the reliability of 
that information and assign it appropriate weight.53  
Ideally, such standards would operate at a high level, addressing 
the big picture of how an investigation should be conducted, how digital 
information should be stored, how to preserve a digital chain of custody, 
and how to think about the legal and ethical responsibilities that court 
actors may have to those who forward information for court purposes or 
to those who are otherwise connected to that information. The standards 
should not get into the details of which software to use or the exact 
methods of analysis because the various tools and methods change 
quickly. Doing so would potentially render the standards obsolete. 
Instead, the focus should be on basic principles of data collection, 
storage, analysis, and presentation.  
In October 2017, eighteen experts from around the world—
including international prosecutors, digital forensics experts, open source 
investigators, academics, diplomats and activists—gathered in Bellagio, 
Italy to discuss the growing practice of conducting open source 
investigations for international accountability purposes, and to begin a 
dialogue around the development of legal standards, including a possible 
protocol.54 Participants included representatives from the ICC, the 
Commission for International Justice and Accountability, the Geneva 
Academy, the Association for the Study of War Crimes, WITNESS, 
Amnesty International, and the Syrian Archive.55 Consensus was reached 
on several key issues. For instance, the parties agreed upon definitions 
relevant to open source investigations conducted for international legal 
purposes and several recommended outputs for helping to advance this 
field of practice, including an international protocol designed to increase 
the quality and consistency of the use of open source methods for 
evidence collection and verification.56 As a result, the Human Rights 
Center at the University of California, Berkeley began drafting an 
international protocol with support from a wide circle of advisors, with a 
probable release date by 2020. The protocol will be translated into 
multiple languages for the broadest possible application. The audience 
will include first responders, NGOs, court actors, national war crimes 
teams, activists, and others who are not operating under a specific 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP).  
																																																						
53 THE NEW FORENSICS USING OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION TO INVESTIGATE 
GRAVE CRIMES, supra note 5, 15–17, 19. 
54 Id. at 13. 
55 Id. at 14. 
56 Id. 
No. 1]    DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW	 140	
The experts also agreed upon the need to develop a community 
of practitioners that can peer review online open source investigations, 
including the potential development of an ongoing roster of experts.57 At 
a minimum, this community will attempt to advance relevant methods, 
encourage ethical practice, and identify individuals with specific 
methodological expertise.58  
In addition to reaching consensus on key definitions, the group 
agreed on principles that should—at a minimum—underlie the protocol. 
These include the need for59: 
1. preservation (to ensure that information that is 
uploaded to the internet is not lost to history if, for 
example, it is removed by platforms for violating 
terms of service agreements or community 
guidelines, or for other purposes); 
2. legality (to ensure that investigations do not fall 
afoul of human rights norms, privacy considerations, 
or the law); 
3. transparency of methods (any expert in open source 
investigations should be able to understand the 
methods that were used and explain them to a court; 
ideally, peer investigators should be able to replicate 
the investigation process and reach similar 
conclusions); 
4. security (a mitigation of harm provision that should 
take into consideration the physical, digital, and 
psycho-social well-being of the investigator, the 
investigated, the person who created and/or posted 
the item to the internet, and anyone featured within 
that item); and 
5. objectivity (when conducted by legal investigators, 
the investigation should not favor either side, but 
instead should focus on both incriminating and 
exonerating information). 
An overarching consideration is ethics, which may manifest in 
different ways across these five principles.	 Moreover, creative thinking 
and mastering diverse verification techniques can heighten the reliability 
of the evidence. On the discovery side, it is important to assess how 
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people in a given community communicate and turn to those sources for 
potential information; for example, turning to Twitter makes little sense 
if no one in that community uses it. It is equally important to assess the 
terms used by that community (including slang, which can be used to 
locate relevant online conversations), the sometimes-diverse spellings of 
key names, and variations in the location, gender, and age of users.  
Any open source information used in court proceedings should 
be carefully verified. As mentioned earlier, verification should include a 
minimum of two steps: (1) verification of the source and (2) verification 
of the content. Primary objectives should include validating the source or 
the initial creator and the individual who uploaded or shared the content, 
the location and time the content was created, and the “reason” the 
content exists. Answering the who, what, where, when, why, and how 
underlying digital data helps maximize that information’s potential use 
by prosecutors by helping place that information in context, and helps 
judges award information appropriate weight when entered into 
evidence.  
 A wide variety of information can be used to help verify the 
content of photographs and videos. Such information includes: (1) the 
identification of any metadata; (2) geolocation of any images (for 
example, using satellite imagery to identify the probable location of 
distinctive background markers, such as notable buildings or other 
surroundings); (3) chronolocation, like using sun calculation tools to 
corroborate probable time of day, or using weather records to help 
confirm the purported date or location; (4) background research into the 
uploader and/or original documenter to determine if it is likely that she 
was actually where she would have needed to be to capture the 
information (for example, scanning social media to see if the documenter 
regularly posts information from or about that country or apparently 
visited the country around that time); and (5) the use of newspaper 
articles and NGO reports to check external consistency and provide 
context.    
A. Gathering Metadata 
 While the admissibility of digital evidence varies across 
jurisdictions, certain practices maximize the potential for acceptance. 
Metadata may help establish the time and date the file was created, any 
associated account, information about the device the file was created on, 
and any edits made to the file.60 Ideally, metadata is available to help 
verify and authenticate potential evidence. Electronic documents, such as 
word documents, often contain metadata that may aid in the verification 
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of the content.61 The data is automatically produced by the software or 
may be supplied by the item’s creator.62 Since metadata is typically 
generated automatically, often without the knowledge or aid of the user, 
it is less likely to be manipulated or deleted than other content.63 In the 
case of video footage, investigators may be able to use metadata to 
determine the location of the place featured in the video and the creator 
of the video, which can then be extrapolated out to investigate featured 
events.  
The interpretation of metadata, however, requires a set of 
fundamental assumptions. For instance, one must assume that the time 
zone on the device correctly reflects its surrounding environment at the 
time of the information’s creation and that no one overrode or 
contaminated the metadata.64 Thus, corroboration of metadata is often 
necessary. 
B. Establishing Chain of Custody 
Chain of custody65 is a fundamental and critical issue for 
physical and offline documentary evidence, yet it is often overlooked by 
activists when securing potential evidence from open sources. The 
preservation of chain of custody can enhance transparency around how 
the investigator acquired the information and help ensure a lack of 
tampering with any collected information.66  
 Two of the biggest concerns with digital evidence are the risk of 
manipulation and the risk of take down, especially regarding graphic or 
controversial imagery. Archiving any photograph or video found online 
helps ensure that material will still be accessible for court purposes, even 
years in the future. It also ensures that legal actors can reference the 
video, photograph, post, or other content without solely relying on 
screenshots, which—like any digital image—can be manipulated. Tools 
such as Meedan’s Keep,67 Enrique Piracés’ Video Vault,68 and the 
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65 Preserving chain of custody consists of documenting who had access to a unit 
of evidence and when, as an accountability mechanism to protect against anyone 
tampering with that evidence. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
66 See The Engine Room, supra note 30, at 36. 
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Internet Archive’s Wayback Machine69 can be used to safely store digital 
files in a virtual space to mitigate the risk of an uploader or an adversary 
deleting the original. Tools like Hunch.ly70 take chain of custody to the 
next level so that the path can later be forensically analyzed by not only 
making it possible to access the acquired information, but also creating a 
record of how the digital search was conducted. Increasingly, legal 
investigators are “hashing”71 content so that they can later confirm the 
integrity of the evidence by checking that it hasn’t been modified since 
the original capture.72 
However, investigators rarely start the chain of custody. 
Frequently, electronic evidence, especially in the form of video, is shared 
via private networks. This makes it impossible for investigators to verify 
the original time of the content’s creation and the initial individuals 
through whom the content passed. The mere act of examining digital 
data—reading or opening an electronic file—risks contamination. 
Furthermore, videos shot by non-professionals are often of relatively 
poor quality, making verification more difficult. While technology 
companies, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, do store metadata 
affiliated with videos and photographs internally, they are reluctant to 
release that information for international criminal justice purposes 
without going through a mutual legal assistance treaty (MLAT) or other 
formal court process, in part to avoid endangering users or infringing on 
user privacy. The higher standard for open source materials to be used 
for trial, versus the standard for journalistic and/or human rights 
advocacy purposes, makes documenting all discovery, verification and 
preservation practices a necessity. Ensuring evidence is admitted and 
accorded significant weight by judges may largely depend on the amount 
of metadata collected, the preservation of chain of custody, and the 
quality of verification and authentication.  
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 There are both internal and external markers of reliability that 
increase the likelihood that digital data can be authenticated. The 
following chart specifies metrics for both categories: 
 
Category Internal Markers External Markers73 
Metadata Date stamps, timestamps, 




Location Street signs, prominent 
landmarks 
Storage/ Chain of 
Custody 
Integrity Whether tampered with, via 
editing or manipulation 
Testimony 
Continuity Capturing event in its entirety, 
people arriving/leaving, 
surroundings 
Replicable process for 
gathering and storing the 
evidence 
Identity  Hash values that serve as a 
unique identifier and can be 
assigned to a single file or 
group of files.  
Consent of use in legal 
proceeding 
 
 Taking into consideration these internal and external markers can 
help investigators and prosecutors maximize the legal value of the 
information they collect and help judges and other fact finders assess 
both its veracity and its reliability. 
CONCLUSION 
As mentioned above, guidelines, including an international 
protocol, are currently being developed to clarify the basic practices and 
minimum standards that should be employed when conducting online 
open source investigations and verifying that content for courts. Such 
guidelines will help international criminal investigators obtain 
appropriate information for prosecution and provide support for how 
information should properly be acquired, preserved, and presented. 
While the amount of digital data accessible to legal investigators will 
continue to grow exponentially, digital evidence must be properly stored, 
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catalogued, and mined in order to avoid a digital backlog.74 Ultimately, 
international criminal investigators should adhere to forthcoming 
standards to ensure that the paramount images—those images that 
frontline activists and survivors may risk their lives to acquire—can 




74 See Lindsay Freeman, Digital Evidence and War Crimes Prosecutions: The 
Impact of Digital Technologies on International Criminal Investigations and 
Trials, 41 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 283, 333–35 (2018) (discussing the importance 
of lawyers using new technologies to manage digital evidence. 	
